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CRYING WOLFISH:
THE UPCOMING CHALLENGE TO
BLANKET STRIP-SEARCH POLICIES
IN FLORENCE V. BOARD OF
CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
AARON JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of the appropriate balance between security and
individual rights—an intractable problem in any society committed to
both—lies at the heart of the upcoming Supreme Court case Florence
1
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. In Florence, the Court will address a
specific iteration of this perennial issue: whether the Fourth
2
Amendment permits jail policies mandating strip searches of every
person arrested, even when the offense is trivial and there is no
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is attempting to smuggle
3
weapons, drugs, or other contraband.
The Court addressed a similar issue once before. In its five-to-four
4
1979 decision Bell v. Wolfish, the Court created and applied a fourfactor balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of physically

* 2013 JD/MA candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful for the efforts of
Hannah Banks, whose industry, insight, and eye for detail made this commentary possible.
1. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2011).
2. The Fourth Amendment, incorporated and made applicable against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Brief for Petitioner at i, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed
June 20, 2011). “Reasonable suspicion” is a very low standard. As the Court has noted,
“reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing
considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [it] requires at least a minimal level of
objective justification. . . . [An] officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–
24 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
4. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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5

intrusive searches conducted within detention facilities. The Court
6
divided closely, but ultimately upheld a policy requiring that all
inmates submit to a visual body-cavity search after each contact visit
7
with someone from outside the facility.
Despite previous agreement on the proper interpretation of Bell, a
circuit split has recently developed, with each side emphasizing
different aspects of the decision. Because each side can fairly claim
consistency with Bell, the Court’s decision in Florence is difficult to
predict and may ultimately depend on the Court’s value judgment as
to whether security should trump individual rights in this particular
context. Adding further uncertainty is a separate precedent, Turner v.
8
Safley, which may have subsumed Bell and provides a more
deferential and generally applicable standard for evaluating detention
9
regulations. If Bell is applied, blanket policies mandating strip
searches of all arrestees likely will be upheld by a closely divided
Court. However, if the Court decides that Turner supplies the proper
standard, the Court probably will remand to the Third Circuit with
instructions to apply Turner’s reasonable-relationship test.
II. FACTS
On March 3, 2005, Albert Florence was pulled over by a state
10
trooper in Burlington County, New Jersey. After asking for
identification, the trooper arrested Florence pursuant to a bench
11
warrant issued in 2003 for his failure to pay a fine. Although
Florence’s wife provided the arresting officer with official
documentation showing that the ticket had already been paid, the
5. Id. at 559–60.
6. The Court was divided five-to-four on the issue of strip searches only. Regarding the
panoply of other issues it considered, the Court’s vote was six-to-three. See id. at 522.
7. Id. at 559–60. Some courts and policies employ terminology that differentiates between
“strip searches” and “visual body-cavity searches,” although others do not. Compare Bull v. City
& Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 969 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing a policy stating
that “[s]trip searches include a visual body cavity search. A strip search does not include a
physical body cavity search”), and Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“A ‘strip search’ involves a visual inspection of the naked body of an inmate. A ‘visual body
cavity search’ is a strip search that includes the visual examination of the anal and genital
areas.”), with Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393 n.1 (10th Cir. 1984) (defining “strip search” as
“having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a
visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, or female breasts of such person”).
8. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
9. Id. at 81.
10. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496 (D.N.J. 2009), rev’d,
621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).
11. Id.
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county had failed to update its computer system and the officer
12
continued with the arrest.
After arresting Florence on the defunct warrant, the officer
13
brought him to the Burlington Jail. There, Florence was directed, in
line with a policy applicable to all arrestees, to undress completely,
hold his arms out, and turn fully around while an officer sat within
14
arm’s length. Florence was also told, possibly in violation of the jail’s
15
own policy, to “open his mouth, lift his tongue . . . and lift his
16
17
genitals.” He was then directed to shower.
After six days of imprisonment in Burlington, Florence was
18
19
transported to the Essex Jail. There, pursuant to a similar policy,
20
Florence was strip searched a second time. Officers directed him and
several others to strip and shower while two officers watched; he was
then told to open his mouth and lift his genitals, turn away, squat and
21
cough, then turn back around. The next day, the charges against
22
Albert Florence were dismissed.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since deciding Bell v. Wolfish in 1979, the Court has considered
23
other cases involving intrusive searches and has repeatedly
24
recognized the importance of prison security. However, Bell remains
12. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 3.
13. Florence, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
14. Id. at 496–97.
15. The policy of the Burlington Jail differentiated between “visual observation” and
“strip searches.” The former involved having the inmates undress so that an officer could check
them for scars, marks, and tattoos. Id. at 498. The latter also included telling the inmates to
“spread their buttocks and/or lift their genitals.” Id. According to the Burlington Jail’s internal
policies, detainees like Florence, who did not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion, were
supposed to be subjected to “visual observation” but not to “strip searches.” Id. at 497.
16. Id. at 496–97.
17. Id. at 497.
18. Id.
19. In contrast to the policy at Burlington, the policy in force at the Essex Jail required all
arrestees to submit to a strip search, and did not differentiate between “strip searches” and
“visual observation.” Id. at 499.
20. Id. at 497.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. E.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (2009) (holding
unconstitutional a strip search of a teenage girl); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (upholding the detention and manual body-cavity search of a woman
suspected of smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal).
24. E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison security is a
compelling state interest . . . .”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
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the only case in which the Court has addressed blanket policies
25
mandating strip searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees.
Accordingly, it likely will be central to the Court’s decision in
Florence.
In the alternative, the Supreme Court may instead apply the
26
highly deferential standard from Turner v. Safley. Turner’s
reasonable-relationship test is limited “only to rights that are
27
‘inconsistent with proper incarceration’” and the Court has not
directly applied Turner to Fourth Amendment rights within a prison
28
or jail. Still, the Court has held that Fourth Amendment rights are
29
severely limited within detention facilities and could establish
Turner’s standard as the proper test for Fourth Amendment violations
in such locations.
A. The Key Precedent: Bell v. Wolfish
The most important precedent for the resolution of Florence is the
Supreme Court decision authored by Justice Rehnquist in Bell v.
Wolfish. In that case, the Supreme Court considered challenges to
30
several practices at a federal custodial facility in New York City. The
facility primarily held pretrial detainees, but also housed smaller
numbers of convicted inmates serving short sentences, people charged
31
with contempt, and witnesses held in protective custody. One
challenged policy mandated that every inmate submit to a strip and
visual body-cavity search after every contact visit with a person from
32
outside the facility. This policy applied to all inmates, regardless of
the reason for their incarceration, and did not require any level of
33
suspicion that they possessed contraband.

U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
25. Daphne Ha, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An
Interdisciplinary Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2731 (2011).
26. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
27. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126, 131 (2003)).
28. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 306 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010).
29. E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (holding that there is no Fourth
Amendment protection for a prisoner’s cell because such protection “cannot be reconciled with
the . . . needs and objectives of penal institutions”).
30. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979).
31. Id. at 523–24.
32. Id. at 558. The Court described the visual body-cavity search as follows: “If the inmate
is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The
vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also are visually inspected.” Id. at 558 n.39.
33. Id. at 558.
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The Court noted that both convicted prisoners and pretrial
34
detainees retain some constitutional protections. The Court also
recognized, however, that these retained rights can be limited or
35
retracted in the interest of internal discipline. Given the importance
of this interest, “[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
36
practices . . . needed to . . . maintain institutional security.”
Against this deferential backdrop, the Court assumed (without
deciding) that both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain
some Fourth Amendment rights, but noted that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits only searches that are unreasonable under the
37
circumstances. What is reasonable “is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application,” and requires “a balancing of the
need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
38
that the search entails.” Regarding a strip search in a detention
facility, courts must consider four factors: “[T]he scope of the
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
39
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”
Applying this four-factor balancing test, the Court combined
consideration of the place and justification factors and opined that
“[a] detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security
40
dangers.” Even though body-cavity searches revealed hidden
contraband only once during the jail’s short history, the Court read
the absence of a record as “a testament to the effectiveness of this
41
search technique as a deterrent.” Such disregard for a requirement
of a factual record implies that security against contraband is so
central to jail and prison administration that the need for specific
measures need not actually be proven.
In contrast to its analysis of the location and jail’s security
concerns, the Court spent very little time on the manner of the search
or the individual interests at stake, offering briefly that it did “not
34. Id. at 545.
35. Id. at 546. The Court later clearly held that “prison security is a compelling state
interest.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005).
36. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (stating that
security decisions are “peculiarly within the province . . . of corrections officials, and . . . courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment”).
37. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
38. Id. at 559.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the
personal privacy of inmates” and that “conduct[ing] the search in an
42
abusive fashion . . . cannot be condoned.” But ultimately, to the
question of whether visual body-cavity searches can “ever be
43
conducted on less than probable cause,” the Court answered yes.
B. Circuit Split on the Meaning of Bell
The federal circuit courts were in accord as recently as 2007
regarding the unconstitutionality of policies requiring strip searches
(or other similarly intrusive searches) of all detainees, regardless of
44
reasonable suspicion. Since then, however, two circuits have reversed
course and upheld such policies. In Florence v. Board of Chosen
45
46
Freeholders, the Third Circuit joined them.
1. Circuit Decisions Striking Down Blanket Strip-Search Policies
The circuit courts applying the Bell four-factor balancing test to
strike down blanket strip-search policies generally have emphasized
the intrusiveness of the search, downplayed security concerns
(especially as compared to those in Bell), and noted that less
restrictive alternatives would serve the same goals just as well. First,
the First Circuit described a strip search as “an extreme intrusion on
47
personal privacy and an offense to the dignity of the individual.”
42. Id. at 560.
43. Id. Notably, this language leaves in serious doubt just what “less than probable cause”
means, and thus what the Fourth Amendment requires before a strip search of a pretrial
detainee is permissible. Justice Powell wrote a brief separate opinion bearing on this issue, the
entirety of which reads:
I join the opinion of the Court except the discussion and holding with respect to body-cavity
searches. In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned by such a search, I think at
least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal
and genital searches described in this case. I therefore dissent on this issue.
Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, this opinion has not
been dispositive of Bell’s meaning for lower courts.
44. See Katherine A. James, Standard Operating Procedure: Take It All Off [N.G. Ex Rel.
S.C. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004)], 44 WASHBURN L.J. 665, 675 (2005).
45. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).
46. Compare id. at 311 (upholding strip searches without reasonable suspicion), Bull v.
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same), and Powell v.
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (same), with Roberts v. Rhode Island,
239 F.3d 107, 108 (1st Cir. 2001) (requiring reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search),
Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (same), Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 798
(2d Cir. 1986) (same), Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1985) (same), Stewart v.
Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1985) (same), Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394–
95 (10th Cir. 1984) (same), Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983)
(same), Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (same).
47. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Other courts have
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Second, the court opined that new arrestees are less likely to smuggle
contraband than detainees leaving a contact visit because arrests,
48
unlike contact visits, are generally unplanned. Third, given the
paucity of instances in which a body-cavity search was necessary to
discover contraband, less extreme measures—such as only searching
the clothes of petty offenders or requiring reasonable suspicion—
49
would have been equally effective. In sum, the intrusiveness of the
search, the lower security risks involved, and the availability of
50
alternatives rendered the policy unconstitutional.
2. Circuit Decisions Upholding Blanket Strip-Search Policies
On the other side of the split, the three Circuits that applied Bell’s
four-factor test to uphold blanket strip-search policies have
emphasized security concerns, deference toward prison officials, the
minimal factual record of smuggling in Bell, and the similarly or less
intrusive nature of the searches as compared to those in Bell. First, the
Eleventh Circuit, for example, reiterated the dangers of smuggling
and added the further security concern of identifying gang members
who “are often more violent, dangerous, and manipulative than other
51
inmates, regardless of the charges against them.” The court rejected
the argument that arrest usually comes as a surprise as “factual[ly] . . .
unsupportable” because some members see arrest coming, others turn
themselves in, and others (especially gang members) deliberately get
52
themselves arrested. Second, the court noted that the policy upheld
in Bell was extraordinarily broad: despite the minimal factual record
of smuggling, it required no level of suspicion and did not
differentiate between convicted felons, suspected misdemeanants, and
53
the unaccused. Finally, the searches at issue were less intrusive than
54
those in Bell. In short, because the balance between privacy and
security so closely resembled that in Bell, the policy was
used even stronger language. E.g., Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1993)
(describing a strip search as “an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude”).
48. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111; see also Howard Friedman, Strip Searches and the Fourth
Amendment Rights of Detainees and Prisoners, 2004 WL 2800491, at *8 (2009) (“Policies
involving routine strip searches upon admission of people who have just been arrested and are
waiting for bail to be set or for a first court appearance have been held unconstitutional, in part
because such individuals do not typically plan to be arrested.”).
49. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112.
50. Id. at 111–13.
51. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1311 (internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 1313.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1314.

AJOHNSON 12.1.11 V.1 (DO NOT DELETE)

48

12/1/2011 9:06 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 7

55

constitutional.

C. A Possible Alternative: The Reasonable-Relationship Test of Turner
v. Safley
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court articulated a highly
deferential and more generally applicable standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of policies that impinge upon the retained
56
constitutional rights of prisoners. In striking down a provision that
limited inmates’ ability to get married and upholding a provision
restricting correspondence between inmates, the Court held that
“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
57
penological interests.”
This reasonable-relationship test considers four factors. First,
there must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and
58
a legitimate, neutral government interest. Second, courts should
consider whether there remain alternative means of exercising the
59
asserted right. Third, courts should take into account the impact of
accommodating the right, particularly on guards, other inmates, and
60
the allocation of detention resources. Fourth, the absence of feasible
alternatives that present only a de minimis cost to prisons can indicate
unreasonableness, but there is no requirement that a regulation be the
61
least-restrictive alternative.
The Turner standard is more deferential than the standard in
62
Bell. Although it applies “only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with
63
proper incarceration,’” it has been construed broadly to include
claims regarding freedom of association, inmate correspondence,
receipt of publications, attendance at religious services, and the right

55. Id. at 1302. Accord Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
56. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987).
57. Id. at 89.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 90.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 90–91.
62. E.g., Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Because we
conclude that plaintiffs lose even under the . . . approach of Bell, we need not decide if that
approach has been superseded by the more deferential Turner one.”).
63. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126, 131 (2003)).
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64

not to be forcibly medicated. The Supreme Court has upheld
limitations on Fourth Amendment rights in detention facilities in a
65
number of cases, but “has [never directly] applied the reasonablerelationship test of Turner to a Fourth Amendment challenge to
66
prison policies.” In addition, it is unclear whether Turner even
67
applies to jails or is limited only to prisons. Nonetheless, the Court
could extend the Turner standard to the Fourth Amendment issues in
68
Florence.
IV. HOLDING
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Third Circuit
reversed the district court and held that a blanket policy of strip
searching all arrestees, regardless of their suspected offense and in the
absence of reasonable suspicion, is constitutional under the Fourth
69
Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish.
The Third Circuit began by laying out its task: “[T]o determine
which line of cases [in the circuit split] is more faithful to the Supreme
70
Court’s decision in Bell.” The court applied the four-factor test from
Bell to balance government interests in security against the personal
71
rights of inmates. Regarding invasiveness, the court found that “the
searches at issue [were] less intrusive than the visual body-cavity
72
searches” in Bell. It likewise concluded that the manner and place
73
prongs were satisfied because of the similarities with Bell.

64. Id. at 510; see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (applying Turner to
uphold the denial of newspapers, magazines, and photographs to dangerous inmates); Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361–62 (1996) (applying Turner to strike down a court’s requirement of
sweeping changes to a prison’s library and legal systems).
65. E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (finding no Fourth Amendment
protection within prison cells).
66. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 306 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). However,
in Washington v. Harper, the Court applied the Turner standard to a due process challenge to
uphold a prison policy that impinged upon bodily autonomy by allowing the forced medication
of seriously mentally ill inmates. 494 U.S. 210, 224–25 (1990).
67. Compare Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (limiting the application of
Turner to prisons), with Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2007) (opining
that Turner does apply to jails).
68. See Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“Although Bell continues to provide definitive guidance for analyzing detention-facility strip
searches under the Fourth Amendment, Turner v. Safley is also relevant to our analysis.”).
69. Florence, 621 F.3d at 311.
70. Id. at 299.
71. Id. at 301.
72. Id. at 307.
73. Id. at 308.
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The Third Circuit devoted much of its analysis to the justifications
for the search, determining that “the security interest in preventing
smuggling at the time of intake is as strong as the interest in
74
preventing smuggling after . . . contact visits.” As in Bell, the low risk
and minimal record of smuggling were insufficient to require the jails
to differentiate between different types of inmates or to articulate
75
individualized suspicion to justify a strip search. Critically, the Third
Circuit rejected the argument that the security risk was lower than in
76
Bell because arrests for trivial offenses are usually by surprise. Even
if such arrests are usually unexpected, sometimes they are not, and
people arrested for serious crimes could coerce or cajole those
accused of minor crimes to smuggle weapons or contraband for
77
them.
Ultimately, because of the policies’ similarity to the one upheld in
Bell, the Third Circuit concluded that the facilities’ security interests
outweighed the deprivations of inmate privacy, and held the policies
78
of Burlington and Essex Counties constitutional.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner Florence’s Arguments
Petitioner Florence’s overarching argument is that the Bell
balancing test requires reasonable suspicion before conducting a strip
79
search of a minor offender. In general, this five-point argument is
heavy on anecdotal evidence of the harms of strip searches and
empirical evidence of the feasibility of alternatives, but lighter on
relevant Supreme Court precedent.
First, Florence argues that a practical consensus developed in the
wake of Bell, asserting that strip searches of minor offenders are
unreasonable without individualized suspicion. Until recently, this
74. Id. at 307. The court also considered two further interests advanced by the
government: identification of gang members by observing their tattoos, and preventing the
spread of contagious diseases. Id.
75. Id. at 308–09.
76. Id. at 308.
77. Id. The Supreme Court has found such reasoning persuasive at least once before. In
upholding an across-the-board ban on contact visits in a jail, the Court opined that “[i]t is not
unreasonable to assume, for instance, that low security risk detainees would be enlisted to help
obtain contraband or weapons by their fellow inmates who are denied contact visits.” Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984).
78. Florence, 621 F.3d at 311.
79. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 3.
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consensus included every circuit to consider the issue, “every relevant
division of the U.S. Department of Justice,” including the Bureau of
80
Prisons, several other government offices, and eighteen states.
Second, Florence also presses that strip searches are an extreme
invasion of personal dignity, especially for sensitive populations like
victims of sexual assault, first-time offenders, members of religious
communities that emphasize modesty, and women who are
81
menstruating or lactating. Blanket policies preclude the discretion
necessary to accommodate these groups.
Third, Florence offers several stark examples to show that blanket
strip-search policies have “sweeping implications” given the “number
82
of trivial offenses for which individuals are regularly arrested.” For
example, the Essex and Burlington Jails alone had strip searched
individuals charged only with car equipment violations, failure to use
83
a turn signal, or riding a bicycle without an audible bell. These
examples illustrate the disproportionate treatment blanket policies
permit, especially in the case of arrests by overzealous officers.
Fourth, Florence concedes that smuggling is a problem, but argues
that a standard of individual suspicion, coupled with other less
intrusive detection measures, would just as effectively safeguard
security interests. Florence offers the findings of a federal court, which
reviewed 23,000 suspicionless strip searches of arrestees during a fouryear period and concluded that “there was at most one instance in
which a person smuggling drugs—and none carrying weapons—might
84
have evaded detection under a reasonable suspicion regime.”

80. Id. at 13–17.
81. Id. at 23–25. For example, one Chicago physician subjected to a strip search became
paranoid and depressed, suffered suicidal feelings, and could no longer disrobe anywhere but in
a closet. Id. at 23. A rape victim called her mother after a strip search and told her repeatedly
“they’ve done it again, they’ve done it again.” Id. at 24 (internal alterations omitted). And a
Colorado woman strip searched after a wrongful arrest began lactating, was ordered not to
cover herself with her arms, and had to use a maxi pad to absorb her breast milk. Id. at 24
(citing Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008)).
82. Id. at 24–25. Importantly, the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of
arrests for very minor offenses that do not include the threat of incarceration. Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 25. Florence’s parade of horrible continues with
examples from other districts, such as a woman in Washington, D.C., arrested and strip searched
for eating a sandwich on the Metro, another woman in D.C. arrested for “false pretenses” after
entering a parking garage and immediately leaving because the cost was too high, and a nun
arrested for trespassing at an anti-war protest. Id. at 25–26.
84. Id. at 29–30.
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Because arrests for minor offenses are almost always unexpected, it
is hardly surprising that “there is not a single documented example of
anyone concealing contraband during arrest for a minor offense with
86
the intent of smuggling contraband into the jail.”
Fifth, Florence argues that other alternatives would serve jails’
security interests just as effectively. Upon arrival, jail officials could
search detainees’ clothing and personal property, pat them down,
visually examine them in their underwear, and put them through
metal detectors; individualized suspicion could then justify more
87
intrusive measures. Such suspicion could be based on the nature of
the offense, the circumstances of arrest, or the arrestee’s prior
88
history.
In short, the problems that the blanket policy addresses, but
reasonable suspicion would not, are at best overstated and at worst
nonexistent. For these reasons, Petitioner Florence insists that the
Court should strike down such blanket strip-search policies.
B. The Respondent Jails’ Arguments
The Respondent Jails offer three reasons why the Court should
affirm the Third Circuit and uphold policies requiring strip searches of
all arrestees. First, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that the
89
Fourth Amendment does not apply to intake searches of arrestees,
90
or applies in only a minimal way. Whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to a particular expectation of privacy hinges on whether
91
“society is prepared to recognize [that expectation] as reasonable,”
and recent cases have opined that “a right of privacy . . . is
fundamentally incompatible with the close and continued surveillance
92
of inmates and their cells.” Thus, because it cannot comport with
93
security interests, no right to privacy exists within detention facilities.

85. Id. at 38 (contrasting the planned visits in Bell with unplanned arrests).
86. Id. at 29 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
87. Id. at 31–32.
88. Id. at 32–33.
89. Brief for Respondents Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility & Essex Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t at 3,
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Brief
for Essex].
90. Brief for Respondents Bd. of Chosen Freeholders et. al at 20, Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Brief for Burlington].
91. Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 16 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526
(1984) (internal quotations omitted)).
92. Id. at 19 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527–28).
93. Id. at 21.
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The Jails backed off this claim during oral arguments, however, by
conceding that there should be some level of suspicion to justify a
94
manual body-cavity search. This concession implies that inmates
retain minimal privacy interests, rather than no privacy interests.
Second, if inmates retain any privacy rights, then the reasonablerelationship test of Turner v. Safley should apply, which the policies at
95
issue easily satisfy. Turner applies whenever a detention policy
implicates a constitutional right that is inconsistent with proper
incarceration, and privacy under the Fourth Amendment falls
96
squarely within that category. Turner’s highly deferential test
requires only that the policy be “reasonably related to legitimate
97
penological interests.” The burden is on the prisoner to prove
unreasonableness, and given the deference due to detention officials,
98
that burden is not easily satisfied. Respondents argue that “there is
an unquestionably valid, rational connection between the searches
99
and security.” Furthermore, there is no reason to differentiate
between minor and serious offenders; if such a distinction were
recognized, those charged with serious crimes might coerce minor
100
offenders into secreting contraband for them. Because there is no
way to accommodate the individual’s privacy interest without
sacrificing security or imposing substantial costs on the detention
facility, Respondents argue, the policies should be upheld under
101
Turner.
Third, an analysis under the balancing test of Bell v. Wolfish yields
102
the same result.
Bell, they argue, created a “special needs”
exception, applicable here, which eliminates the normal requirement
for either reasonable suspicion or probable cause before searching an
103
104
individual. Moreover, each of the factors considered in Bell —the
94. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 40–41, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No.
10-945 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Transcript], available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-945.pdf.
95. Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 25; see also Brief for Burlington, supra note 90, at 26.
96. Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 26–27.
97. Brief for Burlington, supra note 90, at 26 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)); see also id. at 25 (contrasting “reasonably related” with “arbitrary or purposeless”).
98. Id. at 27 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“The burden . . . is not
on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”)).
99. Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 30.
100. Id. at 34–35.
101. Id. at 37–39.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Id. at 39–41.
104. See supra Part III.A.
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scope of the intrusion and the manner, place, and justifications of the
105
search—weigh at least as heavily in Florence as they did in Bell.
Further, in addition to smuggling concerns, the Jails add the interest of
106
identifying gang members and preventing the spread of lice and
107
communicable disease.
In brief, the Jails argue that the reduced privacy interests in
detention facilities, the compelling interest in security, and the
similarities between the circumstances of Florence and Bell require
that the policies be affirmed as constitutional.
VI. ANALYSIS
The circuits requiring reasonable suspicion before strip-searching
minor offenders have been faithful to Bell insofar as they have
applied its balancing test fairly and produced outcomes that are
108
consistent with the specific language of its holding. The Third
Circuit, however, employed the stronger interpretation of Bell—it
109
looked at not only what the Court said but what it did. The policy
upheld in Bell was extraordinarily broad: it did not differentiate
between categories of inmates, but required strip searches of
suspected felons, misdemeanants, and the unaccused alike. Moreover,
it required only the flimsiest factual record of a smuggling problem
that only strip searches could address. And perhaps most importantly,
as Justice Powell’s separate opinion made clear, the Bell majority
110
expounded no limiting requirement of reasonable suspicion.
Here, there are only two material differences between the facts of
Bell and the facts of Florence. First, the policies involved in Florence
are, if anything, less intrusive than the one at issue in Bell. The policies
in Florence always require strip searches, and only sometimes require

105. Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 41–44.
106. Id. at 28, 34.
107. Brief for Burlington, supra note 90, at 41.
108. E.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[In Bell,] the Court
found that visual body cavity searches . . . can be conducted on less than probable cause. . . .
This Court held [later] that, at least in the context of prisoners held for minor offenses, the Bell
balance requires officers to have a reasonable suspicion that a particular detainee harbors
contraband prior to conducting a strip or visual body cavity search.” (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
109. See supra Part III.B.2.
110. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 563 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned by such a search, I think
at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal
and genital searches described in this case. I therefore dissent on this issue.”).
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111

visual body-cavity searches. In contrast, Bell mandated visual body112
cavity searches for everyone after a contact visit. This difference
weighs in favor of finding the searches constitutional.
The second difference—the strength of the security interest—cuts
the other way. As many of the circuit courts have emphasized, arrests
for trivial offenses, such as traffic violations and failure to pay fines,
are usually unexpected; therefore, the risk of planned smuggling is
113
minimal. The problem with relying on this difference to justify a
114
divergent outcome is that Bell did not require a record. Rather, the
Court’s deference was so extreme that “security” became almost a
magic word, erasing any requirement that even demeaning practices
be justified by a showing of necessity. As a result, the differences
surrounding the strip searches are probably too slender a reed to
distinguish Bell.
In short, there is no major problem with the Third Circuit’s
reading of Bell—the problem is with Bell itself. For at least three
reasons, the Court should reconsider this decision or limit its reach.
First, Bell dramatically undervalues the invasive nature of strip
115
searches. The Seventh Circuit has appropriately described them “as
demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying,
unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and] signifying degradation and
116
submission,” and commentators have noted that strip searches
117
would be considered sexual assault in any other context. Moreover,
the Court has repeatedly recognized strong, constitutionally
significant interests in bodily integrity. For example, in medical
118
decision-making and reproductive rights cases, this interest has been
described as nearly inviolate and founded on basic human dignity.
Why such logic loses its force at the prison gate is a mystery.

111. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497–99 (D.N.J. 2009),
rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).
112. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
113. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111; see also Friedman, supra note 48, at *8.
114. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
115. See generally Brief for Psychiatrists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Florence
v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Brief for
Psychiatrists].
116. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal
quotations omitted).
117. See Ha, supra note 25, at 2742; see also supra Part V.A.
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (referring to “the
urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, [which
is] implicit in the meaning of liberty”).
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Second, reasonable suspicion is so low a standard that it is difficult
to imagine that its application could noticeably hinder security efforts.
Reasonable suspicion requires only “a minimum level of justification”
and that an officer “be able to articulate more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch” that the detainee has
119
contraband. Reasonable suspicion could be provided by the nature
of the charge, the inmate’s behavior, or the circumstances surrounding
120
arrest. This standard thus provides at least some—but likely too
little—protection for the individual privacy interests at stake.
Third, it is important to keep in mind that most people housed in
jails have only been convicted of a minor offense, or have not yet
been convicted of anything. Despite the Court’s holdings that not all
deprivations within a detention facility technically qualify as
121
“punishment,” it is doubtful that this distinction provides inmates
much comfort.
The Third Circuit’s decision in Florence is faithful to Bell, and its
analysis is generally sound. But because Bell fails to appreciate the
severe invasiveness of strip searches, the Supreme Court should
reconsider this precedent—or at least cabin its influence.
VII. POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS
122

Assuming it reaches the merits, it is difficult to predict the
outcome of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. In general, the
Court’s recent record regarding the conditions in detention facilities
123
has been mixed, and oral arguments did little to clarify how the
124
Court is likely to rule. Which test the Court will apply is still

119. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
120. It is true that this standard requires discretion, that discretion can be abused, and that
a standard of reasonable suspicion could be employed in a discriminatory manner. But the
alternative—that everyone is forced to undergo a strip search—simply extends the abuse to
everyone. This is a strange sort of equality.
121. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979).
122. It is possible the Court will remand because the question of whether the policies at
issue violate state law has not yet been fully addressed; see Brief of Former Attorneys General
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–11, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No.
10-945 (U.S. filed June 24, 2011).
123. Compare Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (upholding a state prison policy
denying especially dangerous inmates access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs), with
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (upholding a court order to reduce the population
of severely overcrowded prisons).
124. See generally Transcript, supra note 94; see also Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: No
Flat Rule on Strip-searches?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
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Given this ambiguity, Florence is likely to be a close case.

A. Applying Bell v. Wolfish to Uphold the Policies
By a slim margin, the most probable outcome is that the Court
will apply the Bell balancing test to uphold the blanket strip-search
126
policies. Such an opinion might look much like the Eleventh
127
Circuit’s opinion in Powell : the Court could emphasize the sheer
128
breadth of the policy at issue in Bell and that the searches
129
conducted in this case are less intrusive than those Bell upheld. The
Court would likely also reiterate the deference owed detention
130
officials and the centrality of security concerns in jails and prisons. It
may also suggest that a blanket policy is actually more protective of
individual dignity than reasonable suspicion because it precludes
131
singling out specific inmates for worse treatment. In short, such an
opinion would argue that the balance between security and privacy,
and the similarity to Bell, require that the policies be upheld.
B. Applying Bell v. Wolfish to Strike Down the Policies
A second plausible opinion would apply the Bell balancing test to
strike down the policies at issue. The holding of such an opinion
probably would be limited. The Court may state that reasonable
suspicion is required before conducting strip searches of suspected
nondrug, nonviolent misdemeanants only, and may differentiate
132
between strip searches and mandatory supervised showers. It would
com/2011/10/argument-recap-no-flat-rule-on-strip-searches/.
125. Of course, there is a possibility that the Court will conclude that both Bell and Turner
reach the same result and thus would leave undecided which test is orthodox. See Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) (describing “the Court’s duty to avoid deciding constitutional
questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case”).
126. This margin comes from oral arguments. Justice Kennedy is widely considered the key
swing Justice and has been the deciding vote in some recent criminal cases. See, e.g., Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). During oral arguments, Justice Kennedy indicated his belief that a
blanket policy is actually more protective of individual dignity than a standard of reasonable
suspicion, which can be used to single out specific inmates. Transcript, supra note 94, at 6.
However, there is also some indication that Justice Alito might defy expectations and vote to
strike down the policies at issue. See Orin Kerr, Thoughts on the Strip-Search Case,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 12, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/thoughts-on-thestrip-search-case/.
127. Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
128. Id. at 1303.
129. See id. at 1302.
130. See id. at 1311.
131. This is especially likely if Justice Kennedy writes the majority opinion. See supra note
126.
132. This seems to be the position Florence’s attorneys ultimately advocated at oral
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almost certainly emphasize the degrading and potentially traumatic
133
nature of strip searches, especially for sensitive populations. In turn,
it would minimize the security concern by noting that arrest for minor
134
offenses is usually a surprise and that an individual can be arrested
135
and taken into custody on even minor charges. Furthermore, the
Court would probably also note that reasonable suspicion is a low
136
standard and is easily satisfied.
C. Applying Turner v. Safley
A third plausible, but less likely, outcome would involve the
Court’s abandonment of the Bell standard in favor of the test in
137
Turner. In this case, one of two things would probably happen. The
less likely option is that the Court would itself apply the highly
deferential Turner standard to uphold the policies by emphasizing the
rational connection between the policies and a compelling security
138
interest. The more likely option, however, is that the Court would
hold that Turner supplies the proper standard and remand to the
139
Third Circuit for its application.
The outcome of the decision is highly uncertain, but the most
probable options are that the Court will either apply Bell’s broad
mandates to uphold the challenged policies, carve out a narrow
exception, or hold that the standard of Turner has subsumed Bell and
remand. Though the decision seems likely to be hotly disputed, none
of the plausible opinions will please ardent civil libertarians or the
arguments. Transcript, supra note 94, at 26–32.
133. See Brief for Psychiatrists, supra note 115, at 14–16 (describing women, children,
survivors of sexual or domestic abuse, and those with particular religious or cultural beliefs as
especially likely to suffer serious harm from a strip search).
134. See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2001).
135. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding the arrest of a
woman for failure to wear a seatbelt, an offense punishable by a fine of up to fifty dollars); see
also Transcript, supra note 94, at 37, 41–42.
136. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (“While reasonable suspicion is a
less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence, [it] requires at least a minimal level of objective justification. . . .
[An] officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch of criminal activity.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
137. It is possible the Court granted certiorari not just to resolve a circuit split, but to make
clear that Turner had subsumed Bell.
138. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“It bears repetition . . . that
prison security is a compelling state interest . . . .”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)
(holding that “there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it” (internal quotations omitted)).
139. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (remanding to the Ninth Circuit to
apply strict scrutiny, rather than the Turner standard, to a race-based regulation in a prison).
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defenders of the rights of the accused and the convicted. That battle
was lost with Bell.

